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Human Challenges of Remote 
Piloting 
• Loss of natural sensing  
• Control and communication via radio link 
• Physical characteristics of control station 
• In-flight transfer of control  
• Reliance on automation  
• Flight termination   
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The Problem 
• Lack of data on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems 
(RPAS) incidents 
• Relatively few RPAS reports have been submitted 
to NASA’s ASRS by RPAS pilots 
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Critical Incident Technique 
• In 1940’s, researchers asked pilots to recall pilot 
error incidents 
– Many “errors” reflected poor cockpit design 
– Results led to standardized cockpit design in modern 
aircraft 
 
 
Major accident 1 
Minor accidents 10 
Reportable incidents 30 
Minor events 600 
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The Current Study 
• Goal: Examine the feasibility of a method to collect 
the operational experiences of RPAS pilots  
– Information will be used to identify needed 
improvements in control station design, procedures, 
training, etc    
• Will provide independent and complementary data 
to supplement NASA simulations and flight tests  
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Approach 
• Focus groups with 2-3 pilots at a time 
• Participants asked to recall events that they have 
experienced while operating a remotely piloted 
aircraft 
1. A hazardous situation or error 
- Could involve the design of the system, procedures, 
communication, or other issue  
2. The rectification of a hazardous situation or error 
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Approach 
• Participant identities remain confidential  
• De-identified incident reports will be made public 
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Preliminary Results 
• 23 participants 
• 90 incidents described 
• Weight classes of the remotely piloted aircraft: 
 
Aircraft max takeoff weight     # of reports 
Less than 400 lbs       17 
2000-15,000 lbs        60 
Greater than 15,000 lbs      13 
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Problems Mentioned by UAS Pilots 
 
 
10 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Camera view illusion
Stale lost link mission
Weather
Lack of sensory information
Checklists
Data entry errors and slips
Maps and charts
ATC
Control transfer
Mode error/automation
Controls and displays
Link management and quality
Number of Mentions 
Link issues 
1. Lost link 
2. Multiple losses of link 
3. U/D 
4. Voice latency 
5. Accidental control transfer 
6. Lost link timer and “lost link OK” 
– Entering areas with uncertain coverage  
– ATC certainty 
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Lost link (1) 
“We were flying really far out … about 90 kilometers 
from the antenna. But I passed some random mountain 
peak for about one second and the aircraft went into 
emergency mode. Luckily I had the correct emergency 
mode programmed. If I didn't, I could've lost the 
aircraft”. 
        
 
       < 400 lbs 
Lost link (2) 
“A pilot programmed “lost link okay” for a 3-hour period 
while the aircraft was loitering on satellite control. 
While he had the aircraft it actually went into lost link 
and it was still lost link when I came in to take over. I 
didn’t want to take an aircraft that I have no idea where 
it’s at or what it is doing. I did eventually take over the 
aircraft and another GCS, who had line-of-sight control, 
finally took over the aircraft”.  
 
       >2000 lbs 
Multiple lost link 
“One day the power company severed a power line. We 
lost link to all UASs … The uninterrupted power system 
(UPS) in the GCS has a maximum of 18 minutes of 
power available until the generators are up and running, 
but power ran out before the back-up generators were 
up and running”.      
        
  
       > 2000 lbs 
 
U/D 
“Sometimes the signal to the aircraft is weak. And in the 
meantime, a maintenance guy …  turns on the power to 
the aircraft that he is getting ready to work on, it can 
interfere with my aircraft’s signal and I end up getting the 
camera view from that other aircraft.  …. Prior to putting 
on aircraft power, maintenance should make sure that no 
other unmanned aircraft are on final, but they don’t. This 
can also happen with other UAS GDT operations”. 
 
       > 2000 lbs 
Voice latency 
“There is a delay between clicking the press-to-talk and 
talking. This is very difficult to manage when in very 
busy airspace, and listening for a gap to talk. 
Sometimes by the time we press the talk button, with 
the satellite delay, the gap is gone and we step on other 
aircraft. … This does not happen with [LOS] because 
they … transmit from the GCS direct to the tower”. 
        
       > 2000 lbs 
 
Accidental control transfer (1) 
“I’m LR and I was preparing to take control of the 
aircraft from the MCE. The transmitters from my GCS 
were accidently left on. When I slewed the directional 
antenna to get the picture of the aircraft (the down link 
info), this automatically gave me control of the aircraft. I 
was not intending to take control of the aircraft at this 
time”. 
        
 
       >2000 lbs 
Accidental control transfer (2) 
“We were getting the aircraft ready for flight. A back-up 
GCS operator skipped a couple of steps on the check 
list and accidentally took full control of the aircraft 
while it was on the launcher.  He was setting up the 
control station and was trying to be in the receive 
mode but inadvertently was in transmit mode. The 
aircraft went into full throttle and flight control surfaces 
started moving while there were a lot of people 
working around the launcher”. 
       < 400 lbs 
Lost link timer 
“Flight over the pole. Terrible Iridium connectivity 
problem. Data link problems … you are passed off and 
passed off …. Moisture in the air attenuates Iridium 
signals. If the airplane didn’t get a call in 30 minutes, it 
would return. It made many turnarounds due to it being 
out of link then coming back on mission time. This 
affected fuel burn due to time out features. It would 
reacquire and then return on mission.  Set time-out 
feature just short of the actual mission duration”. 
        
       < 400 lbs 
 
So what? 
• Human actions can affect link. 
– In manned aviation pilot actions do not generally 
degrade operation of control cables and fly-by-
wire systems. 
– In unmanned aviation flight crew actions can 
impact the C2 link.  
20 
